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ARGUMENT I
PLAINTIFF CONFUSINGLY AND INCORRECTLY
CITES AND APPLIES UTAH LAW AS TO
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS
First, the Plaintiff admits(page 11 of Brief of Appellee) that
the ONLY GROUNDS for shareholder liability in this action is
because the shareholders,
"... failed to insure that NOTICE to the creditors was given
before dissolution and also failed to insure that debts owed
by the corporation were satisfied before the corporation's
assets were distributed to its shareholders."
The

Plaintiff

subsections

then

1408,

cites portions

of the Utah

and

(either

1406(2),

Code

16-10a

intentionally

or

negligently) failing to cite the balance of the applicable of code
sections. The balance of those code sections are determinative of
the results of this action. It's kind of like picking and choosing
only the portions of the section you want while discarding the bad
parts.
Second, the Plaintiff cites Boyle v. Colorado Patio, 654 P2d
335, as supporting the Plaintiff's argument that lack of notice to
corporate creditors in dissolution of a corporation automatically
implies liability to the shareholders.

The case has no such

holding.
The problem is that the Plaintiff has improperly mixed,
equated and applied two different laws; namely the Bulk Sales Law
Utah Code 70A-6-101 et seq, and dissolution of a corporation Utah
Code 16-10a-1401 et seq, borrowing portions from both laws as he
1

chooses.
suggest

Plaintiff improperly mixes parts of the two laws to
that

liability.

notice

is

a

requirement

to

avoid

shareholder

Then Plaintiff then applies Boyle, supra, a Colorado

case, as support for the argument.

Boyle, supra, however does not

base its holding on Utah statutory law or even Colorado statutory
law, but on common law and Tort.

The convoluted analysis of the

statutory law and the application of Boyle, simply makes no sense.
Lets look at corporate dissolution and shareholder liability
under Utah law. To find individual shareholder liability the code
specifically provides, section 1408(2), that
"...Total liability may not exceed the total value of the
assets distributed to him..."
That doesn't mean as Plaintiff states, that Defendant is deemed to
have received assets of a value equal to the debt.

It is limited

to the value of the assets actually distributed to him.

If the

Plaintiffs argument was applied in this action the individual
shareholders could be responsible for a debt far exceeding the
value

of the corporation's

actually

distributed

to

him

assets,
(It

irrespective

is noted

that

of what was
all

of

the

shareholders specifically deny receiving any distribution of any
assets of the corporation in this action, thus posing a issue of
fact which can not be inferred in law).
Further, Utah law, section 16-10a-1406(2), provides the ONLY
method for dissolving corporations and the ONLY method by which a
shareholder may have liability imposed on him by any creditor of
the corporation.

Subsection

(3) does provide a method for a
2

shareholder to limit his liability, that is by giving notice.
Subsection (5) provides that if the notice is properly given then
no claim can be had against the shareholders or the corporation.
This code section does not require the notice but only provides a
method to limit any claims that may be presented against a
corporation or a shareholder.

Lack of notice is not a fraud, nor

does it automatically imply shareholder liability, as proposed by
the Plaintiff.
In this action the Defendant admits not giving notice as is
possible under 16-10a-1406, which allows the Plaintiff to proceed
against the corporation on whatever claim he may have against the
corporation.

However, lack of the notice does not expand the

effect of the code, and provide exposure to the

individual

shareholders beyond that provided by the law in section 16-10a1408, ie, to the amount of assets distributed to him.
Plaintiff cites Boyle, supra a Colorado case hoping to salvage
and support his lack of notice argument.

However, Boyle, only

applies Colorado law,(none of which is cited by the Plaintiff)
which deals with the Bulk Sales law and has no reference to any
corporate dissolution law. Most importantly the court there found
as the basis of liability to the individual shareholder was a
BREACH OP A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP, a tort, the holding was not
based on an application of the notice requirements of the Bulk
Sales law or of a statutory dissolution law.

Breach of fiduciary

duty does imply individual liability when it is found.
stated the sole shareholder, page 337;
3

The court

"...Breached his fiduciary obligation not to defeat the claims
of third-party creditors, the trial court properly entered
judgment against defendant individually."
Bovle, supra simply has no application to this action whatsoever.
There are no findings in this action of any breach of a fiduciary
duty, and in fact the Plaintiff admits that the only basis for
liability is statutory i.e., because each individual shareholder
was "deemed" to have had distributed to him the full amount of
Plaintiffs claim. That simply is not the law in Utah. The trial
court simply erred in finding any liability to any shareholder.
ARGUMENT II
NUMEROUS MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT
EXIST WHICH PREVENT A GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The sole basis of the Plaintiff's argument is that the
Defendants misrepresented

what the Brinecell model

216 would

produce.

Generally the Plaintiff claims the misrepresentation to

be

the

that

Brinecell

unit

would

not

produce

10%

sodium

hypochlorite. However, the Defendant's set forth in affidavit and
in written advertising, that the Brinecell unit would only produce
an equivalent 10% sodium hypochlorite(R0263,0271) . The difference
of an equivalent chemical, to the Defendants, was not important
because the Defendant believed that the Plaintiff only intended to
use the Brinecell unit for bleaching. The compound produced by the
Brinecell unit, an equivalent of sodium hypochlorite is better than
sodium hypochlorite when used for bleaching(R0263,0271).

That

material fact is disputed by the Defendants and forms the basis for
all of Plaintiff's claims.

Hence the court improperly granted

summary judgment.

4

The Defendant has already set forth the other facts which are
disputed, in its opening brief and need not restate those facts
which controvert all material facts that the court must use to
grant judgment as requested by Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court simply erred in granting summary judgment in
this matter for all of the reason set forth in the Appellants
opening brief.

Additionally there can be no finding of judgment

against the individual shareholders except in accordance with the
Utah Code 16-10a-1408, and the court may not DEEM

there to have

been a distribution, nor the value of the distribution. There must
have been a specific finding as to a distribution, and it's value,
prior to sustaining a judgment even if all of the other material
facts were not controverted.
DATED this

^~ ( day of March, 1994.
Respectfully submitted,

f—-t?3 ^ - ^ ^ -

— --

ftlCHARD S. NEMELKA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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I hereby certify that on the *-lday of March, 1994, I duly
personally hand delivered two copies of the foregoing Appellant's
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Dennis M. Astill
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9 Exchange Place, 6th Floor
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